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options for national security policy practitioners’ advice for 
the new administration
Sam J. Tangredi
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is professor of national, naval, 
and maritime strategy in the Center for Naval War-
fare Studies of the Naval War College. His career in 
the U.S. Navy included command at sea and numer-
ous assignments in strategic planning and interna-
tional relations. In addition to over one hundred 
journal articles, he has published five books; the 
most recent are Anti-access Warfare: Countering 
A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and, 
as editor, The U�S� Naval Institute on Naval Coop-
eration (Naval Institute Press, 2015).
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration, 
edited by Richard D� Hooker Jr� Washington, DC: National 
Defense Univ� Press, 2016� Available at ndupress�ndu�edu/� 381 
pages� 
Charting a Course is a compendium of analyses and recommendations from the 
scholar-fellows of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), the primary 
research center of National Defense University (NDU), along with a few indi-
viduals from NDU colleges� It is the result of a yearlong project to address defense 
and foreign policy issues in a manner useful to an incoming presidential admin-
istration� It aims to make new officeholders aware of the facts and nuances the 
popular media often overlook� As might be expected, most of the INSS fellows are 
also practitioners with considerable government experience� Thus, the volume is 
more than a theory-based academic report; it incorporates a healthy dose of the 
art of the practical� It is also honest, the editor and authors admitting up front 
that “[w]e see no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems we 
face” (p� xiii)� Rather, it focuses on insights and options�
Editor Richard Hooker, director of INSS, leads off with the expected introduc-
tion to the book’s seventeen chapters, but it raises some interesting issues that 
the reader needs to keep in mind while reading the rest of the book� Particularly 
noteworthy is the question whether we can continue to treat the reemerging great 
powers of Russia and China as “simultaneously benign partners and aggressive 
adversaries” (p� ix)� Hooker suggests that this divergent approach—seeking po-
litical or economic cooperation from nations that refuse to accept global norms—
makes it hard to develop a coherent strategy or 
respond to their actions in a consistent manner�
On a broader level, Hooker’s individual work, 
“American Grand Strategy” (chapter 1), seeks to 
refute the charge that the United States does not 
have a grand strategy� While admitting that no for-
mal grand strategy document exists, he maintains 
that the core interests of the United States and 
its means of securing them have been consistent 
throughout America’s history as a world power� 
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However, his definition of the term is essentially military and practical: “the 
use of all instruments of national power to secure the state” (p� 1)� Others might 
wonder where messianic efforts to promote global democracy—which historians 
such as Walter A� MacDougall (in Promised Land, Crusader State) charge have 
been the dominant U�S� foreign policy since the 1880s—fit into Hooker’s con-
struct; but they do not� Hooker proceeds in a highly rational manner, assessing 
potential actions in terms of ends, ways, and means, as befits someone with expe-
rience on the National Security Council (NSC) staff� But if only political decision 
making—and its end results—were that rational!
The following sixteen chapters break nicely into the two categories of func-
tional (future conflict, defense policy, defense budget, national security reform, 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber policy) and regional (Asia- 
Pacific, NATO/Europe, Russia, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
central Asia, and the high north / Arctic)� The “swim lanes” are therefore well 
established, eliminating both the overlaps and gaps that are typical in edited 
volumes of individual contributions� Overall, the book is well organized and 
superior, in terms of balance, to many other academic compendiums�
It is impossible in limited space to review every chapter; most have important 
takeaway ideas that could provoke many an enlightened discussion� But necessity 
focuses the spotlight onto those with the most original and powerful insights�
Chapter 2, “The Future of Conflict” by Thomas X� Hammes, has a fine discus-
sion of nonstate military actors, hybrid warfare, and the proliferation of technolo-
gies, about which he has written in the past� But it also suggests that the “return of 
mass to the battlefield” and the “return of mobilization” will be features of future 
wars, two elements that strategists have discounted recently� In Hammes’s con-
struction, mobilization refers more to industrial production than to manpower� 
Obviously, the wars he envisions will not be the short ones that many senior 
military leaders seem to expect�
Frank G� Hoffman’s “U�S� Defense Policy and Strategy” (chapter 3) is similarly 
well written� He too advises decision makers to “prepare for longer and harder 
wars” and emphasizes “versatility” in force design, with capabilities that are use-
ful “across the broadest possible spectrum of conflict�” However, he takes the 
contrarian viewpoint even further by advising the Department of Defense (DoD) 
to “reestablish a ‘win two modern MTW’ [major theater war] force construct” 
and shift resources to the U�S� Army so it can apply decisive force on the future 
battlefield� Such has not been the policy of the past two decades, and many think 
the construct “unaffordable�”
Michael J� Meese approaches his quantitative measures in “The American 
Defense Budget 2017–2020” (chapter 4) from the same perspective that former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen expressed: “[t]he single 
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biggest threat to national security is our debt” (p� 62)� Given all other expendi-
tures, Meese sees no way that an increase in the defense budget can be financed� 
However, he would like the administration to recognize that DoD already has 
made greater efforts to cut personnel costs (witness the changes to the retirement 
system) and health care than any other government agency, and Congress needs 
to make similar cuts in entitlement programs� He also notes that there are too 
many flag and general officers for the size of the current force�
Christopher J� Lamb’s “National Security Reform” (chapter 5) is a summary of 
his previous writings advocating specific steps to reform national security deci-
sion making, particularly the NSC system� The problem, as Lamb describes it, 
is that “[a]s the security environment grows increasingly complex and dynamic, 
the current system remains unable to coordinate multiple elements of power” (p� 
83)� Lamb sees the need for three steps in particular: (1) legislation that allows 
the president to empower “mission managers” to lead interagency missions, (2) 
a concerted effort by the president to create collaborative attitudes and behaviors 
among cabinet officials, and (3) adoption of a new model of an assistant to the 
president for national security affairs (known as the national security adviser 
[NSA])� The first two recommendations are necessary to ensure that mission 
managers (who would be subject to Senate confirmation) get the resources to 
actually carry out policy, not just draft it�
The new-model NSA would manage and deconflict the mission managers, 
while also being an honest broker concerning cabinet equities� But the mission 
managers would be responsible for the results, not the “omnipresent, omni-
scient, and omnipotent” NSA that many expect today, but that “does not exist 
and never has�” (Sorry, Dr� Kissinger�) Lamb uses the example of General James 
Jones, USMC (Ret�), as NSA� Jones was praised for his collaboration and process 
management, but was criticized for not working “himself into a state of utter ex-
haustion” by dominating policy debates, putting cabinet members in their places, 
and shadowing the president continuously� Lamb maintains that it is the process, 
not the person, that can deliver success� (Sorry again, Dr� Kissinger�)
Among the regional chapters, James J� Przystup and Phillip C� Saunders lay 
out a concise statement of U�S� national interests in the Asia-Pacific (chapter 9), 
with the maintenance of rules-based norms of international behavior (such as 
in the South China Sea) being the most difficult to achieve� However, they point 
out a factor often overlooked in all the media and business hype about China’s 
inexorable economic growth: “The relationship with Beijing will be challenging, 
but Chinese internal economic and political problems are likely to give U�S� poli-
cymakers more leverage” (p� 198)� Perhaps it is time to wish for an Asian “color 
revolution”?
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While not as contrarian toward current policies, the chapters on NATO (by 
Charles L� Barry and Julian Lindley-French) and Russia (by Peter B� Zwack) do 
suggest that NATO must both deter and reassure Russia, and that expansion 
beyond the current membership probably would give Putin and his successors 
an excuse to divert Russian attention from the country’s declining economic con-
dition� However, the alleged U�S� promise not to expand NATO made to then– 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin cannot be found in writing and cannot be veri-
fied, despite what current Russian president Vladimir Putin believes�
In his chapter on South Asia, Thomas F� Lynch III points to an “escalating 
proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan,” something that certainly 
has not received a lot of press in the United States (beyond that concerning the 
Kabul parliament building and Salma Dam [the “Afghan-India Friendship 
Dam”]) (p� 271)� Lynch includes intelligence activities the two nations have con-
ducted in Afghanistan as but one piece of his overall discussion of competition 
throughout Asia and India-Pakistan tensions in particular� One hopes that he or 
other scholars will research this proxy war in greater detail�
Although not the most detailed discussion, that in chapter 12, Denise Natali’s 
“The Middle East,” has one of the most direct recommendations concerning U�S� 
decision making: “the United States should not attempt to fix failed states� Nor 
should it seek to resolve protracted conflicts without the necessary requisites 
in place, namely political conditions and regional actors committed to making 
necessary compromises” (p� 258)� Instead, the United States “should selectively 
engage and support traditional partners who can serve as strategic anchor points 
in the region” (p� 249)� The first irony of these recommendations is that the 
George W� Bush administration came into office with the same view (or at least 
the president did), but did an about-face after 9/11, attempting to use the invasion 
of Iraq to redirect the Middle East toward (at least somewhat) democratic gov-
ernance� The second irony is that our pre–President Carter foreign policy was to 
rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran as the “strategic anchor points in the region�” Iran is 
now hostile and near-nuclear and Saudi Arabia is a kingdom forged by force that 
seems to promote religious extremism� Israel is, of course, a democratic pillar� 
But reading Natali’s chapter makes one think the United States should just step 
away from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process until the actors are “committed 
to making necessary compromises”—another contrarian recommendation (and 
one with which former president Carter certainly would not concur)�
After lauding the stronger chapters, it is appropriate to identify the problem-
atic� Chapter 8, “Cyber Policy,” is one of the longest chapters, but also the most 
contradictory and—to anyone concerned about the potential dominance of gov-
ernment bureaucracy over the private sector—the scariest� The authors begin by 
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creating an excellent model of the relationships among technology (“the range of 
the possible”), law (“the limits of what is permissible”), and government policy 
(“the realm of the preferable”) (p� 151)� But, as in the rest of the chapter, the au-
thors’ enthusiasm becomes a runaway engine, and they proclaim their model to 
be a “common operating picture” when it is only a conceptual model�
The authors excoriate the federal government for its “industrial age” organi-
zation of departments and agencies that results in a “pile-up of ‘cross-cutting’ 
issues—particularly those generated by the disruptive information/digital age,” 
and they recommend a bewildering array of “issue-specific fusion centers” run 
by “supervisory czars�” While similar in concept to Lamb’s proposal, it diverges 
in scope, with potentially sixty-five centers for cyber issues alone (if I read their 
diagram correctly) (p� 152)� Where we would get the people and funding is un-
examined� Worse, they appear to contradict themselves, suggesting the creation 
of a Department of Cyber, with U�S� Cyber Command located under it instead of 
DoD� They justify this as “[f]ollowing the U�S� Coast Guard precedent of having 
one of the Armed Forces report to an agency other than DOD” (p� 155)� Obvi-
ously, U�S� Cyber Command is not its own armed force, and it exists primarily 
to support the other combatant commanders—hard to do if you are funded and 
directed by a nondefense agency�
The authors conflate information (data, television, film, music, etc�) with in-
formation technology / cyber, and there seems no aspect of cyber in which they 
do not want the government involved: reviewing, requiring, investing in, estab-
lishing connections with nonstate actors, tapping private-sector research, etc� It is 
as if government, not the private sector, is the driver of information technology, 
rather than but one of its consumers� Some of the recommended actions border 
on the patronizing: “[c]onduct outreach to address public fears that AI [artificial 
intelligence] may cause loss of jobs or that autonomous machines may threaten 
public safety” (p� 164)� At this point in AI’s development, who can say that it will 
not cause the loss of jobs or threaten public safety? Part of the chapter’s seem-
ing breathlessness is caused by the authors’ desire to reinforce their insistence 
that cyber is a war-fighting domain “fully as significant as the land, sea, air, and 
space domains�” But is not cyber a tool, an enabler that facilitates action within 
the physical domains? Have we not become dependent on cyber voluntarily? 
The authors conclude with a campaign promise–like statement: “The potential 
opportunities found within the domain of information and cyberspace are seem-
ingly limitless” (p� 168)� That overweening attitude is what makes their chapter 
(and recommendations) so scary�
While not as problematic, chapter 7, “Combating Terrorism,” is the shortest 
chapter and comes across as weak� Perhaps that is because terrorism is discussed 
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in the regional chapters as well� However, the chapter does have a good treat-
ment of the rivalry between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al 
Qaeda that points to the fact that local terrorist groups ally with the most suc-
cessful umbrella organization� The definition of successful seems determined by 
which organization currently gets the most media coverage� There is a notably 
brief suggestion that the attack in San Bernardino, California, was connected to 
ISIL; however, that incident is not mentioned again, whereas other attacks are 
given more detail� One wonders whether that simply reflects the Obama admin-
istration’s reluctance to tie the San Bernardino attack to Islamic terrorism, lest it 
give a hoodlum an excuse to attack a mosque�
The author provides a good discussion on the threat of veteran Islamist foreign 
fighters from the various Middle Eastern wars returning to commit terrorist acts 
in their home countries, but then makes the following curious statement: “Some 
countries, such as Russia, have decided to revoke the citizenship of their foreign 
fighters� But it is not in the interest of the United States to allow these fighters to 
remain in Syria or relocate to another conflict” (p� 143)� But where do we want 
them to go? Not San Bernardino� The solution—which is not one—is that “[t]he 
issue of returnees should receive more diplomatic emphasis, forethought, and 
planning,” and United Nations help is suggested (p� 143)� Guantánamo or its 
equivalent is not discussed�
In summary, Charting a Course—including those chapters not reviewed—is an 
excellent and up-to-date summary of the national security issues that President 
Trump’s administration will face, written by the most practical group of experts 
one might assemble� Whether one does or does not agree with the recommen-
dations, most are argued logically and boldly� As the new DoD officials wait to 
be confirmed, they should read this book before they are inundated by policy 
papers� So should all other students and practitioners of national security affairs�
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